# @mzwing/pi-permission-auto-review

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A [Pi](https://github.com/earendil-works/pi) extension that adds Codex-style automatic permission reviews to [`@gotgenes/pi-permission-system`](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/tree/main/packages/pi-permission-system).

> **my-pi maintenance note:** This directory was imported from the upstream source tag `@mzwing/pi-permission-auto-review@0.2.0` at commit `8d196e4ef0884cac8326c366191dad3f585d470a`. It is loaded from source and maintained directly by my-pi, like `pi-rtk-optimizer`; npm `dist` output is not used. The local compatibility baseline is Node.js 22.19+, Pi 0.84.x, and `@gotgenes/pi-permission-system` 26.2.x.

## Differences between `@gotgenes/pi-permission-model-judge`

[@gotgenes/pi-permission-model-judge](https://github.com/gotgenes/pi-packages/tree/main/packages/pi-permission-model-judge) is a general-purpose model-based authorizer that can be used to evaluate any permission request.

Ours is mostly specialized for OpenAI's `codex-auto-review` model, which is trained to evaluate permission requests in the context of a coding assistant. Our extension aims at providing Codex-style automatic permission reviews for Pi's coding agent.

The bundled baseline is a Pi-specific adaptation of OpenAI Codex Guardian's [`policy_template.md`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/c4f42d161ae44a8d696ee9fb595709661979d187/codex-rs/core/src/guardian/policy_template.md) and [`policy.md`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/c4f42d161ae44a8d696ee9fb595709661979d187/codex-rs/core/src/guardian/policy.md) at revision [`c4f42d161ae44a8d696ee9fb595709661979d187`](https://github.com/openai/codex/commit/c4f42d161ae44a8d696ee9fb595709661979d187). It is bundled at build time; the extension never fetches policy text while reviewing an action.

## Install

The my-pi root package loads `pi-permission-auto-review/index.ts` directly and installs its runtime dependencies. Do not install the upstream npm package separately, or the same authorizer may be registered twice.

For isolated source development, install this directory's development dependencies and run it through the local entry point:

```bash
npm install
pi -e ./index.ts
```

This maintained source variant uses Pi's current `ModelRegistry.getProvider()` API directly and does not depend on `@mzwing/pi-polyfill`.

## Enable

Add `"auto-review"` to pi-permission-system's config:

```json
{
  "authorizerChain": ["auto-review"]
}
```

The config is normally located at `~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-system/config.json`.

Extension config can be omitted. The defaults are:

```json
{
  "provider": "openai-codex",
  "model": "codex-auto-review",
  "reasoning": "low",
  "timeoutMs": 90000,
  "includeBaselinePolicy": true
}
```

`codex-auto-review` is an official hidden model. The extension derives it from Pi's `openai-codex` provider and reuses the existing Codex login.

## Configuration

| Scope   | Path                                                           |
| ------- | -------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Global  | `~/.pi/agent/extensions/pi-permission-auto-review/config.json` |
| Project | `<cwd>/.pi/extensions/pi-permission-auto-review/config.json`   |

Project fields override global fields. `PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR` replaces `~/.pi/agent` when set.

| Field                   | Default             | Description                                  |
| ----------------------- | ------------------- | -------------------------------------------- |
| `provider`              | `openai-codex`      | Pi model-registry provider id                |
| `model`                 | `codex-auto-review` | Model id within the selected provider        |
| `reasoning`             | `low`               | Reasoning level for reviewer calls           |
| `timeoutMs`             | `90000`             | Total budget across all retry attempts       |
| `includeBaselinePolicy` | `true`              | Include the built-in Codex-style risk policy |
| `additionalPolicy`      | omitted             | Trusted operator policy appended to it       |

See the [example config](config/config.example.json) and bundled [JSON Schema](schemas/config.schema.json). Unknown or invalid fields disable automatic decisions and fall through to the normal prompt.

Use `/permission-auto-review` in Pi's interactive TUI to edit and apply global or project config without reloading the session. Available subcommands:

```text
/permission-auto-review show
/permission-auto-review path
/permission-auto-review reset [global|project]
/permission-auto-review help
```

Custom providers and models must be defined in Pi's `~/.pi/agent/models.json`, then selected with this extension's `provider` and `model` fields. To replace the built-in risk policy completely, set `includeBaselinePolicy` to `false` and provide a non-empty `additionalPolicy`.

## Behavior and Limits

### Authorization evidence

The reviewer reads the current session's complete active branch with `SessionManager.getBranch()`, rather than only the post-compaction model context. This keeps original user authorization available after compaction without mixing in abandoned branches.

Only these transcript records can establish authorization:

- Pi session user-role messages (`source: "user"`);
- completed, non-cancelled responses to recognized `ask_user_question` and `plan_mode_question` calls (`source: "user_interaction"`).

Pi does not persist the original `input` event source on user-role messages, so `source: "user"` is a trust boundary provided by the Pi runtime rather than cryptographic proof of keyboard input. Trusted extensions can intentionally create such messages with `sendUserMessage()`; as with the rest of Pi's extension model, only trusted extension code should be installed.

Structured question responses are accepted only when the non-error result matches a preceding recognized tool call and are rebuilt from `details.answers` data. Free-form tool-result text is never promoted to user evidence. Assistant messages, ordinary tool calls/results, custom messages, and compaction/branch summaries remain untrusted even if their text claims to be user content.

Transcript rendering uses separate 10k-token message and tool budgets with per-entry truncation. The first and latest trusted records are retained first, then other trusted records from newest to oldest. The 40-entry recency cap applies only to assistant/tool evidence, so later tool activity cannot evict an already selected user authorization. Truncation indicates missing information; it does not itself raise intrinsic action risk.

### Permission boundaries

- Model, authentication, timeout, provider, or response-format failures defer to the normal human prompt.
- Unexpected internal review failures also defer to the human prompt instead of escaping into the permission gate.
- Three consecutive denials, or ten denials in the latest fifty reviews, open a circuit breaker until the next Pi turn.
- my-pi's maintained pi-permission-system keeps every `path` request inside the delegation envelope. For `external_directory`, built-in read-only path tools (`read`, `find`, `grep`, `ls`) may accept an auto-review `allow`; write, edit, bash, unknown tools, and undetermined surfaces are downgraded to the normal human prompt.

### Diagnostics

Each `auto_review.decision` emitted after transcript construction adds content-free context diagnostics (configuration failures that defer before a review do not have transcript diagnostics):

- `policyRevision`
- `contextSource` (`active-branch`)
- `transcriptEntriesRetained`
- `transcriptEntriesOmitted`
- `transcriptEntriesTruncated`
- `directUserEntriesRetained` / `directUserEntriesOmitted` / `directUserEntriesTruncated`
- `userInteractionEntriesRetained` / `userInteractionEntriesOmitted` / `userInteractionEntriesTruncated`
- `latestTrustedEntryRetained`

These fields distinguish missing or truncated authorization evidence from a model decision made after receiving trusted evidence. Transcript text and model rationale are not persisted. The records are written through pi-permission-system's existing permission-review log when that log is enabled.

## License

[MIT](LICENSE)
