feat: 组合包配置以包内 config/ 为唯一来源，并新增受保护写入人工审批

配置统一：权限策略、硬防御、Tool Search、提示词封面以及新迁入的
RTK、pi-compaction、pi-worktree、pi-hermes-memory 配置全部由扩展
直接读取已安装组合包内的 config/，pi install / pi update 即完成部署；
删除 rebuild-bundle-config.mjs 与 bundle-manifest.json，my-pi/ 只保留
日志与缓存。update.sh 成功升级后将默认 git 来源的已安装副本
reset 回发布版本。AGENTS.md 新增「组合包配置原则」。

脚本整合：search_config.sh / ssh_config.sh 合并为 configure.sh
search|ssh；install.sh / update.sh 共享函数抽到 scripts/lib.sh，远程
安装器改为先下载到临时文件再执行，下载失败可被检测。

权限：hard-guards 新增 protectedWrites，写入 Pi 凭据/设置、已安装
组合包与扩展目录、pi-ssh 凭据库时一律人工确认（跳过 AutoReview、
yolo 与 Session grant，无 UI 时拒绝）；放行 ls、LSP 查询、ctx 只读、
web_search、Chrome 只读与 git 只读命令，skill_manage 改为 ask。

Generated with [Devin](https://devin.ai)

Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

pi-permission-system/test/authority/authorizer-selection.test.ts

@@ -467,4 +467,75 @@ describe("AuthorizerSelection", () => {
       );
     });
   });
+
+  describe("human-only asks (protected writes)", () => {
+    const humanOnlyDetails = (): PromptPermissionDetails =>
+      makeDetails({ humanOnly: true });
+
+    it("goes straight to the local user and never runs configured links", async () => {
+      const link = vi
+        .fn<Authorizer["authorize"]>()
+        .mockResolvedValue({ kind: "allow" });
+      const registry = new AuthorizerRegistry();
+      registry.register("judge", link);
+      const prompter = makePrompterApi();
+      const selection = new AuthorizerSelection(
+        makeDeps({
+          prompter,
+          authorizerRegistry: registry,
+          getAuthorizerChain: () => ["judge"],
+        }),
+      );
+      selection.activate(makeCtx({ hasUI: true }));
+
+      await selection.escalate(humanOnlyDetails());
+
+      expect(link).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(prompter.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+        expect.any(LocalUserAuthorizer),
+        expect.anything(),
+      );
+    });
+
+    it("denies without prompting when the terminal is DenyingAuthorizer", async () => {
+      const prompter = makeInvokingPrompter();
+      const selection = new AuthorizerSelection(makeDeps({ prompter }));
+      // No UI, not a subagent → DenyingAuthorizer terminal.
+      selection.activate(makeCtx({ hasUI: false }));
+
+      const decision = await selection.escalate(humanOnlyDetails());
+
+      expect(decision).toEqual({
+        approved: false,
+        state: "denied_with_reason",
+        denialReason:
+          "写入受保护文件需要人工确认，但当前没有可用的确认界面",
+        confirmationUnavailable: true,
+        decidedBy: {
+          kind: "unavailable",
+          reason: "protected_write_no_local_ui",
+        },
+      });
+      expect(prompter.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    });
+
+    it("denies instead of relaying to a parent on a subagent node", async () => {
+      const prompter = makeInvokingPrompter();
+      const selection = new AuthorizerSelection(
+        makeDeps({ detection: makeDetection(true), prompter }),
+      );
+      selection.activate(makeCtx({ hasUI: false }));
+
+      const decision = await selection.escalate(humanOnlyDetails());
+
+      // ParentAuthorizer.forward would have been invoked if relaying were
+      // still allowed; instead the human-only denial is returned.
+      expect(decision.approved).toBe(false);
+      expect(decision.state).toBe("denied_with_reason");
+      expect(decision.denialReason).toBe(
+        "写入受保护文件需要人工确认，但当前没有可用的确认界面",
+      );
+      expect(prompter.prompt).toHaveBeenCalledOnce();
+    });
+  });
 });

pi-permission-system/test/authority/local-user-authorizer.test.ts

@@ -149,6 +149,33 @@ describe("LocalUserAuthorizer", () => {
     );
   });
 
+  it("hides the session option and forwards the system note on a human-only ask", async () => {
+    const { deps, decisionFn } = makeDeps();
+    const authorizer = new LocalUserAuthorizer(deps);
+    const deferNotes = [
+      {
+        origin: "system" as const,
+        text: "⚠ 该操作将写入受保护文件：/vault/auth.json（凭据，匹配 /vault/auth.json）。",
+      },
+    ];
+
+    await authorizer.authorize(
+      makeDetails({
+        humanOnly: true,
+        deferNotes,
+        // A stale label must not resurrect the session option.
+        sessionLabel: "Yes, for 'read' tool",
+      }),
+    );
+
+    expect(decisionFn).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      expect.anything(),
+      expect.any(String),
+      expect.anything(),
+      { hideSessionOption: true, deferNotes },
+    );
+  });
+
   it("emits the UI event before calling requestPermissionDecision", async () => {
     const calls: string[] = [];
     const events = {

pi-permission-system/test/authority/permission-dialog.test.ts

@@ -178,6 +178,37 @@ describe("requestPermissionDecisionFromUi", () => {
     expect(options[1]).toBe("Yes, for this session");
   });
 
+  describe("hideSessionOption (human-only asks)", () => {
+    it("omits the session option when hideSessionOption is set", async () => {
+      const selectFn = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue("Yes");
+      const ui: PermissionDecisionUi = { select: selectFn, input: vi.fn() };
+      await requestPermissionDecisionFromUi(ui, "Title", "Message", {
+        hideSessionOption: true,
+      });
+      const options = selectFn.mock.calls[0][1] as string[];
+      expect(options).toEqual(["Yes", "No", "No, provide reason"]);
+    });
+
+    it("does not open the scope select when the session option is hidden", async () => {
+      const selectFn = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue("Yes");
+      const ui: PermissionDecisionUi = { select: selectFn, input: vi.fn() };
+      const result = await requestPermissionDecisionFromUi(
+        ui,
+        "Title",
+        "Message",
+        {
+          hideSessionOption: true,
+          sessionScope: {
+            subagentLabel: "This subagent only",
+            servingSessionLabel: "The whole session",
+          },
+        },
+      );
+      expect(selectFn).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(result).toEqual({ approved: true, state: "approved" });
+    });
+  });
+
   describe("sessionScope two-step (forwarded asks)", () => {
     const sessionScope = {
       subagentLabel: "This subagent only",