feat: vendor permission system source

pi-permission-system/src/tool-input-preview.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+import { safeJsonStringify } from "./json-safe-stringify";
+import { redactedJsonStringify } from "./log-redaction";
+
+export const TOOL_INPUT_PREVIEW_MAX_LENGTH = 200;
+export const TOOL_TEXT_SUMMARY_MAX_LENGTH = 80;
+
+export function truncateInlineText(value: string, maxLength: number): string {
+  return value.length > maxLength ? `${value.slice(0, maxLength)}…` : value;
+}
+
+export function countTextLines(value: string): number {
+  if (!value) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  return value.split(/\r\n|\r|\n/).length;
+}
+
+export function formatCount(
+  value: number,
+  singular: string,
+  plural: string,
+): string {
+  return `${value} ${value === 1 ? singular : plural}`;
+}
+
+/** Serialize tool input for display in a permission prompt, unredacted. */
+export function serializeToolInputPreview(input: unknown): string {
+  return normalizeSerializedPreview(safeJsonStringify(input));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serialize tool input for the review log, masking sensitive-keyed values.
+ *
+ * The log path needs its own entry point because the input is flattened to a
+ * string here — by the time it reaches the JSONL writer its keys are gone, so
+ * that boundary's redaction pass can no longer see them.
+ */
+export function serializeRedactedToolInputPreview(input: unknown): string {
+  return normalizeSerializedPreview(redactedJsonStringify(input));
+}
+
+function normalizeSerializedPreview(serialized: string | undefined): string {
+  if (!serialized || serialized === "{}" || serialized === "null") {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  return serialized.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
+}