feat: vendor permission system source

2026-08-28 08:35:57 +00:00 · 2026-08-19 14:35:19 +08:00
parent 198584daf8
commit 410c50a3e5
809 changed files with 157793 additions and 139 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
+import {
+  describeBashCommandContext,
+  flaggedElementLabel,
+  flaggedElements,
+  valueLabel,
+} from "#src/presentation/fact-vocabulary";
+import type {
+  PromptEvidence,
+  PromptPayloadKind,
+} from "#src/presentation/prompt-payload";
+import { makePromptPayload } from "#test/helpers/prompt-details-fixtures";
+
+/** A payload of the given kind whose flagged value and evidence are set. */
+function payloadOf(
+  kind: PromptPayloadKind,
+  value: string,
+  evidence: PromptEvidence[] = [],
+) {
+  const base = makePromptPayload();
+  return {
+    ...base,
+    kind,
+    request: { ...base.request, value },
+    evidence,
+  };
+}
+
+/** An `external path` evidence entry, as the bash external-directory gate emits it. */
+function externalPath(path: string, resolved: string | null): PromptEvidence {
+  return { label: "external path", text: path, detail: resolved };
+}
+
+describe("flaggedElements", () => {
+  it("flags the decision-relevant value for a single-value ask", () => {
+    expect(flaggedElements(payloadOf("path", "/etc/hosts"))).toEqual([
+      "/etc/hosts",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("flags the command for a bash ask", () => {
+    expect(flaggedElements(payloadOf("bash", "rm -rf build"))).toEqual([
+      "rm -rf build",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("flags the escaping paths rather than the command for a bash external-directory ask", () => {
+    expect(
+      flaggedElements(
+        payloadOf("bash_external_directory", "diff /etc/hosts ~/.ssh/config", [
+          { label: "working directory", text: "/repo", detail: null },
+          externalPath("/etc/hosts", null),
+          externalPath("~/.ssh/config", "/home/me/.ssh/config"),
+        ]),
+      ),
+    ).toEqual(["/etc/hosts", "~/.ssh/config"]);
+  });
+
+  it("flags nothing when the value is empty", () => {
+    expect(flaggedElements(payloadOf("tool", ""))).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("valueLabel", () => {
+  it.each([
+    ["bash", "command"],
+    ["bash_external_directory", "command"],
+    ["mcp", "target"],
+    ["tool", "tool"],
+    ["path", "path"],
+    ["external_directory", "path"],
+    ["skill", "skill"],
+    ["skill_read", "skill"],
+  ] as const)("labels a %s ask's value %s", (kind, label) => {
+    expect(valueLabel(payloadOf(kind, "value"))).toBe(label);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["bash", "command"],
+    ["skill", "skill"],
+    ["read", "value"],
+  ])("infers a payload-less forwarded ask's label from its %s surface", (surface, label) => {
+    const base = payloadOf("forwarded", "value");
+    expect(valueLabel({ ...base, request: { ...base.request, surface } })).toBe(
+      label,
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+describe("flaggedElementLabel", () => {
+  it("labels the escaping paths a bash external-directory ask flags", () => {
+    expect(
+      flaggedElementLabel(payloadOf("bash_external_directory", "cmd")),
+    ).toBe("path");
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    "bash",
+    "mcp",
+    "path",
+    "skill",
+  ] as const)("agrees with the value label for a %s ask, whose value is what it flags", (kind) => {
+    const single = payloadOf(kind, "value");
+    expect(flaggedElementLabel(single)).toBe(valueLabel(single));
+  });
+});
+
+describe("describeBashCommandContext", () => {
+  it.each([
+    ["command_substitution", "command substitution"],
+    ["process_substitution", "process substitution"],
+    ["subshell", "subshell"],
+  ] as const)("names a %s context", (context, label) => {
+    expect(describeBashCommandContext(context)).toBe(label);
+  });
+
+  it("names no context for a current-shell command", () => {
+    expect(describeBashCommandContext(null)).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+});