refactor(permission-system): simplify policy and autoreview flow

pi-permission-system/test/authority/forwarded-request-server.test.ts

@@ -2,10 +2,8 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
 import { join } from "node:path";
 import type { ExtensionContext } from "@earendil-works/pi-coding-agent";
 import { afterEach, describe, expect, test, vi } from "vitest";
-import type { Authorizer } from "#src/authority/authorizer";
 import { AuthorizerRegistry } from "#src/authority/authorizer-registry";
 import { AuthorizerSelection } from "#src/authority/authorizer-selection";
-import { encloseInDelegationEnvelope } from "#src/authority/delegation-envelope";
 import { ForwardedRequestServer } from "#src/authority/forwarded-request-server";
 import type { PermissionPromptDecision } from "#src/authority/permission-dialog";
 import type {
@@ -16,7 +14,6 @@ import {
   PermissionPrompter,
   type PromptPermissionDetails,
 } from "#src/authority/permission-prompter";
-import type { PermissionQuery } from "#src/service";
 import {
   makeAuthorizerSelectionDeps,
   registerLink,
@@ -57,9 +54,8 @@ function readResponse(
  * An approving `AskEscalator` that records the details it was handed.
  *
  * The reconstructed `PromptPermissionDetails` is itself the subject of the
- * access-facts and bounded-delegation cases below: they assert its exact shape,
- * and hand it to the real delegation envelope — a collaborator the server never
- * touches, but one that reads the details the server builds.
+ * access-facts cases below: they assert the exact evidence passed to the
+ * serving node's configured authorizer chain.
  */
 function makeCapturingEscalator() {
   const escalated: PromptPermissionDetails[] = [];
@@ -550,9 +546,8 @@ describe("processInbox — child-fixed access facts on the escalated ask", () =>
       value: "git push",
     });
 
-    // Absence, not an explicit `undefined`: the delegation envelope's
-    // `accessIntent?.surface ?? surface` fallback reads the display surface only
-    // when the key is genuinely absent.
+    // Version-skew requests can omit access intent entirely; preserve that
+    // absence instead of manufacturing evidence.
     expect(details).not.toHaveProperty("accessIntent");
   });
 });
@@ -640,49 +635,6 @@ describe("processInbox — the child's payload on the escalated ask", () => {
   });
 });
 
-describe("processInbox — bounded delegation over forwarded asks", () => {
-  const query: PermissionQuery = {
-    checkPermission: vi.fn(),
-    getToolPermission: vi.fn(),
-  };
-  const log = makeAuthorizerLog();
-  const allowingLink: Authorizer["authorize"] = () =>
-    Promise.resolve({ kind: "allow" });
-
-  test("caps a link's allow on a forwarded path ask to defer", async () => {
-    const details = await escalateForwardedAsk({
-      id: "req-envelope-path",
-      source: "tool_call",
-      surface: "write",
-      value: "/worktree/issue-42/.ssh/config",
-      accessIntent: makeForwardedAccessIntent({
-        surface: "path",
-        matchValues: ["/worktree/issue-42/.ssh/config"],
-        boundaryValue: "/worktree/issue-42/.ssh/config",
-      }),
-    });
-
-    const enclosed = encloseInDelegationEnvelope(allowingLink);
-
-    // The gate surface, not the displayed tool name, decides exclusion — so a
-    // forwarded path ask is capped exactly like the same ask made locally.
-    expect(await enclosed(details, query, log)).toEqual({ kind: "defer" });
-  });
-
-  test("passes a link's allow on a forwarded bash ask through", async () => {
-    const details = await escalateForwardedAsk({
-      id: "req-envelope-bash",
-      source: "tool_call",
-      surface: "bash",
-      value: "npm test",
-      accessIntent: makeForwardedAccessIntent({ matchValues: ["npm test"] }),
-    });
-
-    const enclosed = encloseInDelegationEnvelope(allowingLink);
-
-    expect(await enclosed(details, query, log)).toEqual({ kind: "allow" });
-  });
-});
 
 describe("processInbox — the serving node's chain adjudicates a forwarded ask", () => {
   /** A serving node with UI: its terminal is the human prompt. */