refactor(permission-system): simplify policy and autoreview flow

This commit is contained in:
云服务部-叶林立
2026-09-03 02:01:06 +08:00
parent 180da95ab7
commit 6e7effa792
112 changed files with 911 additions and 10346 deletions
@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
import { homedir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import type { AccessIntent } from "#src/access-intent/access-intent";
import { BashProgram } from "#src/access-intent/bash/program";
import { describeBashExternalDirectoryGate } from "#src/handlers/gates/bash-external-directory";
import type {
GateBypass,
GateDescriptor,
GateResult,
} from "#src/handlers/gates/descriptor";
import { isGateBypass, isGateDescriptor } from "#src/handlers/gates/descriptor";
import type { ToolCallContext } from "#src/handlers/gates/types";
import { pathFlavorForPlatform, win32PathFlavor } from "#src/path/path-flavor";
import { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
import {
allEvidence,
findEvidence,
type PromptPayload,
} from "#src/presentation/prompt-payload";
import type { PermissionCheckResult } from "#src/types";
import { getNonEmptyString, toRecord } from "#src/value-guards";
import { makeResolver } from "#test/helpers/gate-fixtures";
// ── helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Every escaping path the payload lists, in payload order. */
function externalPaths(payload: PromptPayload): string[] {
return allEvidence(payload, "external path").map((entry) => entry.text);
}
function makeTcc(overrides: Partial<ToolCallContext> = {}): ToolCallContext {
return {
toolName: "bash",
agentName: null,
input: { command: "cat /outside/project/file.ts" },
toolCallId: "tc-1",
cwd: "/test/project",
...overrides,
};
}
function makeCheckResult(
state: "allow" | "deny" | "ask",
overrides: Partial<PermissionCheckResult> = {},
): PermissionCheckResult {
return {
state,
toolName: "external_directory",
source: "special",
origin: "builtin",
...overrides,
};
}
/** Extract the policy match values a resolve(intent) call carries. */
function intentValues(intent: AccessIntent): readonly string[] {
if (intent.kind === "access-path") return intent.path.matchValues();
return [];
}
/**
* Mirror the handler's parse-once derivation: parse the bash command into a
* shared `BashProgram` and inject it, exactly as `permission-gate-handler.ts`
* does, so the gate is exercised through the production wiring.
*/
async function describeGate(
tcc: ToolCallContext,
resolver: ScopedPermissionResolver,
): Promise<GateResult> {
const command = getNonEmptyString(toRecord(tcc.input).command);
const bashProgram =
tcc.toolName === "bash" && command
? await BashProgram.parse(
command,
new PathNormalizer(pathFlavorForPlatform(process.platform), tcc.cwd),
)
: null;
return describeBashExternalDirectoryGate(tcc, bashProgram, resolver);
}
// ── tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("describeBashExternalDirectoryGate", () => {
it("returns null when tool is not bash", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ toolName: "read" }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it("returns null when command has no external paths", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "ls -la" } }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
describe("resolved shell expansions (#694)", () => {
it("prompts for a $HOME write target that does not exist yet", async () => {
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask"));
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({
input: {
command: 'touch "$HOME/pi-permission-system-repro-new"',
},
}),
resolver,
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
expect(externalPaths((result as GateDescriptor).payload)).toEqual([
join(homedir(), "pi-permission-system-repro-new"),
]);
});
// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noTemplateCurlyInString: intentional literal — a braced shell expansion, not a template string
it("prompts for a braced ${HOME} reference", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noTemplateCurlyInString: intentional literal — a braced shell expansion, not a template string
makeTcc({ input: { command: 'ls "${HOME}/somewhere"' } }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
expect(externalPaths((result as GateDescriptor).payload)).toEqual([
join(homedir(), "somewhere"),
]);
});
it("does not prompt for a variable it cannot resolve", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: 'CURRENT="$HOME"; ls "$CURRENT"' } }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
});
it("resolves each external path on the external_directory surface via an access-path intent (#418)", async () => {
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask"));
await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "cat /outside/a.ts" } }),
resolver,
);
const intent = resolver.resolve.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(intent).toMatchObject({
kind: "access-path",
surface: "external_directory",
agentName: undefined,
});
expect(intentValues(intent)).toEqual(["/outside/a.ts"]);
});
it("carries the deciding path's access facts on promptDetails (bash external_directory surface)", async () => {
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask"));
const result = (await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "cat /outside/a.ts" } }),
resolver,
)) as GateDescriptor;
const intent = resolver.resolve.mock.calls[0][0];
const path = intent.kind === "access-path" ? intent.path : undefined;
expect(path).toBeDefined();
expect(result.promptDetails.accessIntent).toEqual({
surface: "external_directory",
matchValues: path?.matchValues(),
boundaryValue: path?.boundaryValue(),
});
});
it("emits a bash_external_directory payload listing every escaping path", async () => {
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask"));
const result = (await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "cat /outside/a.ts" } }),
resolver,
)) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.payload.kind).toBe("bash_external_directory");
// The command is the decision value; the paths it reaches are evidence.
expect(result.payload.request.value).toBe("cat /outside/a.ts");
expect(result.payload.evidence).toContainEqual({
label: "external path",
text: "/outside/a.ts",
detail: null,
});
});
it("returns GateBypass when all external paths are session-covered", async () => {
const resolver = makeResolver(
makeCheckResult("allow", { source: "session" }),
);
const result = await describeGate(makeTcc(), resolver);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(isGateBypass(result)).toBe(true);
const bypass = result as GateBypass;
expect(bypass.action).toBe("allow");
expect(bypass.log).toMatchObject({
event: "permission_request.session_approved",
details: expect.objectContaining({ resolution: "session_approved" }),
});
expect(bypass.decidedBy).toEqual({
kind: "session_approval",
surface: "external_directory",
pattern: null,
});
});
it("returns GateDescriptor with multi-pattern sessionApproval for uncovered paths", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "diff /outside/a.ts /outside/b.ts" } }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.sessionApproval).toBeDefined();
if (!desc.sessionApproval) return;
expect(desc.sessionApproval.patterns.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
});
it("returns GateBypass when all external paths are config-level allowed", async () => {
// Config-level allow (source: "special") should suppress the prompt,
// not just session-level allow. This was the bug: source !== "session"
// kept config-allowed paths in the uncovered set.
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) =>
intentValues(intent).length > 0
? makeCheckResult("allow", { source: "special" })
: makeCheckResult("ask"),
);
const result = await describeGate(makeTcc(), resolver);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(isGateBypass(result)).toBe(true);
});
it("uses worst-check state from uncovered paths for preCheck (config deny > catch-all ask)", async () => {
// The path-less extCheck used to always return the "*" catch-all (ask),
// silently downgrading a config-level deny to ask. After the fix, the
// descriptor's preCheck is derived from the actual path check result.
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) =>
intentValues(intent).length > 0
? makeCheckResult("deny", { source: "special" })
: makeCheckResult("ask"),
);
const result = await describeGate(makeTcc(), resolver);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.preCheck?.state).toBe("deny");
});
it("descriptor surface is 'external_directory'", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc(),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.surface).toBe("external_directory");
});
it("descriptor decision surface is 'external_directory'", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc(),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.decision.surface).toBe("external_directory");
});
it("payload carries the command and the boundary it escaped", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "cat /outside/file.ts" } }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
const { payload } = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(payload.kind).toBe("bash_external_directory");
expect(payload.request.value).toBe("cat /outside/file.ts");
expect(findEvidence(payload, "working directory")?.text).toBe(
"/test/project",
);
});
it("promptDetails includes command and tool_call source", async () => {
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ agentName: "agent-1", toolCallId: "tc-5" }),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.promptDetails).toMatchObject({
source: "tool_call",
agentName: "agent-1",
toolCallId: "tc-5",
toolName: "bash",
command: "cat /outside/project/file.ts",
});
});
it("config-allowed path is excluded; remaining ask path produces a descriptor", async () => {
// One path config-allowed, one config-ask → descriptor with only the ask path.
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) =>
intentValues(intent).includes("/outside/a.ts")
? makeCheckResult("allow", { source: "special" })
: makeCheckResult("ask"),
);
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "diff /outside/a.ts /outside/b.ts" } }),
resolver,
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.sessionApproval).toBeDefined();
if (!desc.sessionApproval) return;
expect(desc.sessionApproval.patterns.length).toBe(1);
expect(desc.preCheck?.state).toBe("ask");
});
it("config-denied path makes worstCheck deny even when another path is ask", async () => {
// One path config-denied, one config-ask → descriptor with preCheck.state === "deny".
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) =>
intentValues(intent).includes("/outside/a.ts")
? makeCheckResult("deny", { source: "special" })
: makeCheckResult("ask"),
);
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "diff /outside/a.ts /outside/b.ts" } }),
resolver,
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.preCheck?.state).toBe("deny");
// Both paths are uncovered (neither is allow), so both patterns are included.
expect(desc.sessionApproval).toBeDefined();
if (!desc.sessionApproval) return;
expect(desc.sessionApproval.patterns.length).toBe(2);
});
it("only includes uncovered paths when some are session-covered", async () => {
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) =>
intentValues(intent).includes("/outside/a.ts")
? makeCheckResult("allow", { source: "session" })
: makeCheckResult("ask"),
);
const result = await describeGate(
makeTcc({ input: { command: "diff /outside/a.ts /outside/b.ts" } }),
resolver,
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
// Should have patterns only for the uncovered path
expect(desc.sessionApproval).toBeDefined();
if (!desc.sessionApproval) return;
expect(desc.sessionApproval.patterns.length).toBe(1);
});
});
describe("describeBashExternalDirectoryGate — Git Bash semantics (win32)", () => {
async function describeGateWin32(
tcc: ToolCallContext,
resolver: ScopedPermissionResolver,
): Promise<GateResult> {
const command = getNonEmptyString(toRecord(tcc.input).command);
const bashProgram =
tcc.toolName === "bash" && command
? await BashProgram.parse(
command,
new PathNormalizer(win32PathFlavor, tcc.cwd),
)
: null;
return describeBashExternalDirectoryGate(tcc, bashProgram, resolver);
}
const winTcc = (command: string): ToolCallContext =>
makeTcc({ cwd: "C:/projects/app", input: { command } });
it("does not prompt for a /dev/null redirect target", async () => {
const result = await describeGateWin32(
winTcc("echo hi > /dev/null"),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it("prompts for a /tmp path displayed as typed, not as C:\\tmp", async () => {
const result = await describeGateWin32(
winTcc("ls /tmp"),
makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask")),
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
expect(externalPaths((result as GateDescriptor).payload)).toEqual(["/tmp"]);
});
});
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { AccessPath } from "#src/access-intent/access-path";
import {
resolveExternalDirectoryPolicy,
selectUncoveredExternalPaths,
} from "#src/handlers/gates/external-directory-policy";
import { posixPathFlavor } from "#src/path/path-flavor";
import type { PermissionCheckResult } from "#src/types";
import { makeResolver } from "#test/helpers/gate-fixtures";
const cwd = "/test/project";
function makeCheckResult(
state: "allow" | "deny" | "ask",
overrides: Partial<PermissionCheckResult> = {},
): PermissionCheckResult {
return {
state,
toolName: "external_directory",
source: "special",
origin: "builtin",
...overrides,
};
}
describe("resolveExternalDirectoryPolicy", () => {
it("resolves the path's match aliases on the external_directory surface (#418)", () => {
const path = AccessPath.forPath("/outside/a.ts", {
cwd,
flavor: posixPathFlavor,
});
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("ask"));
const result = resolveExternalDirectoryPolicy(path, resolver, undefined);
expect(resolver.resolve).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
kind: "access-path",
surface: "external_directory",
path,
agentName: undefined,
});
expect(result).toEqual(makeCheckResult("ask"));
});
it("threads the agent name through to the resolver", () => {
const path = AccessPath.forPath("/outside/a.ts", {
cwd,
flavor: posixPathFlavor,
});
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("allow"));
resolveExternalDirectoryPolicy(path, resolver, "reviewer");
expect(resolver.resolve).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
kind: "access-path",
surface: "external_directory",
path,
agentName: "reviewer",
});
});
});
describe("selectUncoveredExternalPaths", () => {
it("returns no uncovered paths when every path resolves to allow", () => {
const paths = [
AccessPath.forPath("/outside/a.ts", { cwd, flavor: posixPathFlavor }),
AccessPath.forPath("/outside/b.ts", { cwd, flavor: posixPathFlavor }),
];
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult("allow"));
const { uncovered, worstCheck } = selectUncoveredExternalPaths(
paths,
resolver,
undefined,
);
expect(uncovered).toEqual([]);
expect(worstCheck).toBeUndefined();
});
it("collects only paths whose resolved state is not allow", () => {
const allowed = AccessPath.forPath("/outside/ok.ts", {
cwd,
flavor: posixPathFlavor,
});
const asked = AccessPath.forPath("/outside/ask.ts", {
cwd,
flavor: posixPathFlavor,
});
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) => {
const values =
intent.kind === "access-path" ? intent.path.matchValues() : [];
return values.includes("/outside/ok.ts")
? makeCheckResult("allow")
: makeCheckResult("ask");
});
const { uncovered } = selectUncoveredExternalPaths(
[allowed, asked],
resolver,
undefined,
);
expect(uncovered.map(({ path }) => path.value())).toEqual([asked.value()]);
});
it("returns the most restrictive uncovered check as worstCheck (deny > ask)", () => {
const asked = AccessPath.forPath("/outside/ask.ts", {
cwd,
flavor: posixPathFlavor,
});
const denied = AccessPath.forPath("/outside/deny.ts", {
cwd,
flavor: posixPathFlavor,
});
const resolver = makeResolver();
resolver.resolve.mockImplementation((intent) => {
const values =
intent.kind === "access-path" ? intent.path.matchValues() : [];
return values.includes("/outside/deny.ts")
? makeCheckResult("deny")
: makeCheckResult("ask");
});
const { worstCheck } = selectUncoveredExternalPaths(
[asked, denied],
resolver,
undefined,
);
expect(worstCheck?.state).toBe("deny");
});
});
@@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import type {
GateBypass,
GateDescriptor,
} from "#src/handlers/gates/descriptor";
import { isGateBypass, isGateDescriptor } from "#src/handlers/gates/descriptor";
import { describeExternalDirectoryGate } from "#src/handlers/gates/external-directory";
import type { ToolCallContext } from "#src/handlers/gates/types";
import { pathFlavorForPlatform } from "#src/path/path-flavor";
import { PathNormalizer } from "#src/path-normalizer";
import type { ScopedPermissionResolver } from "#src/permission-resolver";
import type { ToolAccessExtractorLookup } from "#src/tool-access-extractor-registry";
import { makeResolver } from "#test/helpers/gate-fixtures";
import { makeCheckResult } from "#test/helpers/handler-fixtures";
// ── helpers ───────────────────────────��────────────────────────────��───────
function makeTcc(overrides: Partial<ToolCallContext> = {}): ToolCallContext {
return {
toolName: "read",
agentName: null,
input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" },
toolCallId: "tc-1",
cwd: "/test/project",
...overrides,
};
}
// Default resolver for descriptor-shape tests that do not assert the resolved
// state: returns `ask` for the external_directory surface so a descriptor is
// produced. Tests that assert the typed+resolved matching pass an explicit
// resolver to `describeExternalDirectoryGate` directly.
function gateUnderTest(
tcc: ToolCallContext,
infraDirs: string[],
extractors?: ToolAccessExtractorLookup,
resolver: ScopedPermissionResolver = makeResolver(
makeCheckResult({ state: "ask", toolName: "external_directory" }),
),
) {
return describeExternalDirectoryGate(
tcc,
infraDirs,
resolver,
new PathNormalizer(pathFlavorForPlatform(process.platform), tcc.cwd),
extractors,
);
}
// ── tests ────────────────────��────────────────────────────────────��────────
describe("describeExternalDirectoryGate", () => {
it("returns null when tool is not path-bearing", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ toolName: "bash", input: { command: "ls" } }),
["/test/agent"],
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
it("returns null when path is inside CWD", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/test/project/src/index.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
// ── Pi infrastructure read bypass ─────────────────���────────────────────
it("returns GateBypass for read targeting an infra dir", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({
toolName: "read",
input: { path: "/test/agent/git/some-package/SKILL.md" },
}),
["/test/agent", "/test/agent/git"],
);
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(isGateBypass(result)).toBe(true);
const bypass = result as GateBypass;
expect(bypass.action).toBe("allow");
expect(bypass.decision).toMatchObject({
resolution: "infrastructure_auto_allowed",
result: "allow",
});
expect(bypass.log).toMatchObject({
event: "permission_request.infrastructure_auto_allowed",
});
// Containment allowed this, not a rule the operator wrote.
expect(bypass.decidedBy).toEqual({ kind: "infrastructure_read" });
});
it("returns GateBypass respecting custom infraDirs", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({
toolName: "read",
input: { path: "/custom/infra/SKILL.md" },
}),
["/custom/infra"],
);
expect(isGateBypass(result)).toBe(true);
});
it("does NOT bypass for write tools targeting infra dirs", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({
toolName: "write",
input: { path: "/test/agent/git/some-file.ts", content: "x" },
}),
["/test/agent", "/test/agent/git"],
);
// Should be a GateDescriptor (needs permission check), not a bypass
expect(result).not.toBeNull();
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
});
// ── GateDescriptor for external paths ─────────────────────────────────��
it("returns GateDescriptor with surface 'external_directory'", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(makeTcc(), ["/test/agent"]);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
const desc = result as GateDescriptor;
expect(desc.surface).toBe("external_directory");
});
it("decision value is the external path", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.decision.value).toBe("/outside/project/file.ts");
expect(result.decision.surface).toBe("external_directory");
});
it("carries the child-fixed access facts on promptDetails (external_directory surface)", () => {
const path = "/outside/project/file.ts";
const result = gateUnderTest(makeTcc({ input: { path } }), [
"/test/agent",
]) as GateDescriptor;
const accessPath = new PathNormalizer(
pathFlavorForPlatform(process.platform),
"/test/project",
).forPath(path);
expect(result.promptDetails.accessIntent).toEqual({
surface: "external_directory",
matchValues: accessPath.matchValues(),
boundaryValue: accessPath.boundaryValue(),
});
});
it("emits an external_directory payload carrying the escaped boundary", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.payload.kind).toBe("external_directory");
expect(result.payload.request.value).toBe("/outside/project/file.ts");
expect(result.payload.evidence).toContainEqual({
label: "working directory",
text: "/test/project",
detail: null,
});
});
it("carries a precomputed preCheck and an empty input (matching is done by the gate)", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.input).toEqual({});
expect(result.preCheck).toBeDefined();
expect(result.preCheck?.state).toBe("ask");
});
it("resolves the typed and symlink-resolved aliases on the external_directory surface (#418)", () => {
const resolver = makeResolver(
makeCheckResult({ state: "ask", toolName: "external_directory" }),
);
gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
undefined,
resolver,
);
expect(resolver.resolve).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
expect.objectContaining({
kind: "access-path",
surface: "external_directory",
agentName: undefined,
}),
);
const intent = resolver.resolve.mock.calls[0][0];
expect(intent.kind).toBe("access-path");
if (intent.kind === "access-path") {
expect(intent.path.matchValues()).toEqual(["/outside/project/file.ts"]);
}
});
it("sessionApproval uses deriveApprovalPattern", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.sessionApproval).toBeDefined();
expect(result.sessionApproval?.surface).toBe("external_directory");
expect(result.sessionApproval?.representativePattern).toBeDefined();
});
it("payload contains the external path and the boundary it escaped", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } }),
["/test/agent"],
) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.payload.kind).toBe("external_directory");
expect(result.payload.request.toolName).toBe("read");
expect(result.payload.request.value).toBe("/outside/project/file.ts");
expect(result.payload.evidence).toContainEqual({
label: "working directory",
text: "/test/project",
detail: null,
});
});
it("promptDetails includes path and tool_call source", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ toolName: "read", agentName: "agent-1", toolCallId: "tc-5" }),
["/test/agent"],
) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.promptDetails).toMatchObject({
source: "tool_call",
agentName: "agent-1",
toolCallId: "tc-5",
toolName: "read",
path: "/outside/project/file.ts",
});
});
it("logContext includes the path, and no prompt wording", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(makeTcc(), ["/test/agent"]) as GateDescriptor;
expect(result.logContext).toMatchObject({
source: "tool_call",
path: "/outside/project/file.ts",
});
// The payload's request facts are stamped by the runner, not the gate.
expect(result.logContext).not.toHaveProperty("message");
});
});
// Extension and MCP tools are now external-directory gated (#352) ───────────
describe("describeExternalDirectoryGate — extension and MCP tools (#352)", () => {
it("gates an extension tool with an external input.path", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({
toolName: "my-ext",
input: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" },
}),
["/test/agent"],
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
expect((result as GateDescriptor).surface).toBe("external_directory");
});
it("gates an MCP tool with an external arguments.path", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({
toolName: "mcp",
input: { arguments: { path: "/outside/project/file.ts" } },
}),
["/test/agent"],
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
});
it("uses a registered extractor's external path for a custom-shaped tool", () => {
const extractors = {
get: (name: string) =>
name === "ffgrep"
? (input: Record<string, unknown>) =>
typeof input.target === "string" ? input.target : undefined
: undefined,
};
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({ toolName: "ffgrep", input: { target: "/outside/project/x" } }),
["/test/agent"],
extractors,
);
expect(isGateDescriptor(result)).toBe(true);
});
it("returns null for an extension tool whose path is inside cwd", () => {
const result = gateUnderTest(
makeTcc({
toolName: "my-ext",
input: { path: "/test/project/src/x.ts" },
}),
["/test/agent"],
);
expect(result).toBeNull();
});
});
@@ -847,29 +847,6 @@ describe("GateRunner — request identity", () => {
expect(decisions[0].requestId).toBe(reviewWrites[0].details.requestId);
});
it("stamps a bypass's log entry and decision event with one id", async () => {
const { runner, reviewWrites, decisions } = makeRecordingRunner();
const bypass: GateBypass = {
action: "allow",
decidedBy: { kind: "infrastructure_read" },
log: {
event: "permission_request.infrastructure_auto_allowed",
details: { path: "/x" },
},
decision: {
surface: "read",
value: "/x",
result: "allow",
resolution: "infrastructure_auto_allowed",
origin: null,
agentName: null,
matchedPattern: null,
},
};
await runner.run(bypass, null);
expect(decisions[0].requestId).toMatch(/^perm-/);
expect(decisions[0].requestId).toBe(reviewWrites[0].details.requestId);
});
it("stamps an allow decision event even when nothing is written to the log", async () => {
const { runner, decisions } = makeRecordingRunner();
@@ -118,17 +118,6 @@ describe("ToolCallGatePipeline", () => {
expect(getToolPreviewLimits).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("calls getInfrastructureReadDirs() during evaluate", async () => {
const getInfrastructureReadDirs = vi.fn<() => string[]>(() => []);
const resolver = makeResolver(makeCheckResult());
const inputs = makeGateInputs({ getInfrastructureReadDirs });
const { runner } = makeGateRunner();
const pipeline = new ToolCallGatePipeline(resolver, inputs);
await pipeline.evaluate(makeTcc({ toolName: "read", input: {} }), runner);
expect(getInfrastructureReadDirs).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
it("calls getActiveSkillEntries() during evaluate", async () => {
const getActiveSkillEntries = vi.fn<() => []>(() => []);