my-pi/pi-permission-system

@gotgenes/pi-permission-system

Permission enforcement extension for the Pi coding agent that provides centralized, deterministic permission gates over tool, bash, MCP, skill, and special operations.

Fork notice: This package is a full fork of MasuRii/pi-permission-system, published to npm as @gotgenes/pi-permission-system. It has diverged substantially from upstream in config format, internal architecture, and permission model.

my-pi maintenance note: This directory was imported from upstream tag pi-permission-system-v26.2.1 at commit ec4fdb11343dc94f7185b113e559a4cf9f8dc035. It is loaded from source and maintained directly by my-pi; npm dist output is not used. my-pi uses one global ordinary policy and a separate non-overridable hard-guard file; explicitly configured authorizers may approve any ordinary-policy ask, including path.

What It Does

• Enforces allow / ask / deny at tool-call time with UI confirmation dialogs
• Uses one global ordinary policy file; project policy.jsonc files are not loaded
• Chooses the most specific matching pattern, so a specific deny wins over a broad "*": "allow" regardless of declaration order
• Applies a separate hard-guard policy first so session grants, per-agent rules, and model review cannot override high-risk denies
• Controls Bash, paths, MCP, skills, and tool surfaces while leaving active-tool ownership entirely to Tool Search
• Reviews ordinary ask requests automatically with integrated AutoReview; its allow verdict is final for ordinary tools and path, while defer reaches the next authorizer or human terminal
• Follows the session's current model: AutoReview asks the model you are already chatting with to judge each ask, so the review always reflects the model the operator actually selected; set autoReview.provider and autoReview.model together to pin a different reviewer
• Decides through tool calls only: the reviewer reaches its verdict by calling exactly one of two tools, approve or reject, each carrying a reason — prose answers, even well-formed JSON, are ignored
• Never hard-denies on a refusal or failure: a reject verdict or any review failure defers the ask to the human prompt, with the model's reason shown and labelled model-generated
• Forwards subagent ask decisions to the parent authority and keeps structured audit logs

Install

pi install npm:@gotgenes/pi-permission-system

Quick Start

1. Create ordinary policy at ~/.pi/agent/my-pi/permission-system/policy.jsonc:

   {
     "authorizerChain": ["auto-review"],
     "autoReview": { "enabled": true },
     "permission": {
       "*": "ask",
       "read": "allow",
       "bash": {
         "*": "ask",
         "git status*": "allow"
       }
     }
   }
   

2. Create independent hard guards at ~/.pi/agent/my-pi/permission-system/hard-guards.jsonc:

   {
     "version": 1,
     "permission": {
       "*": "allow",
       "*.env": "deny",
       "*.env.*": "deny",
       "*.env.example": "allow",
       "~/.ssh/**": "deny"
     }
   }
   

3. Restart Pi or run /reload. Ordinary ask requests now reach AutoReview first; only defer opens the human dialog.

The path surface is a cross-cutting gate that applies to all file access — Pi tools, bash commands, MCP calls, and extension tools alike. Extension and MCP tools that operate on paths (via input.path, MCP's input.arguments.path, or a registered access extractor) are gated by default, so a path deny cannot be overridden by a per-tool allow — making it the right place to protect sensitive files like .env or ~/.ssh/* from every tool at once. A path pattern matches both the path as the agent references it and its canonical (symlink-resolved) form, so a deny still fires when a symlink aliases a sensitive target.

For per-tool path patterns (read, write, edit, find, grep, ls), patterns are matched against the file path from input.path. This lets you express rules like "allow reads but deny .env files" at the individual tool level. Like the cross-cutting path surface, per-tool patterns match both the referenced path and its canonical (symlink-resolved) form, so a per-tool deny resists symlink-alias evasion. When Pi's current working directory is known, relative path inputs also match their cwd-normalized absolute form, so src/App.jsx can match both src/* and /workspace/project/*.

Paths outside the working tree have no separate boundary gate. Configure them with the same path, per-tool, and Bash patterns used for in-project paths. These layers still compose with most-restrictive-wins. See docs/configuration.md for the full recipe.

Configuration

The integrated extension uses two independent global JSONC files:

Purpose	Scope	Path
Ordinary policy, runtime knobs, AutoReview	Global only	~/.pi/agent/my-pi/permission-system/policy.jsonc
Non-overridable hard guards	Global only	~/.pi/agent/my-pi/permission-system/hard-guards.jsonc

Project-level policy.jsonc files are ignored. Project agent Markdown remains a separate per-agent restriction mechanism.

The bundle deploys both files with mode 0600 via scripts/rebuild-bundle-config.mjs: every install.sh / update.sh run rebuilds the whole <agentDir>/my-pi/ tree, overwriting local edits without a backup — keep durable changes in the repository's config/ sources. Files left at the former extensions/pi-permission-system/ location are ignored.

Within a pattern map, the most specific match wins: exact patterns, then more literal characters, fewer wildcards, and longer patterns. Declaration order is only a tie-breaker.

There is no external_directory gate. Outside-CWD paths use the same configured tool, path, and Bash rules as other paths.

Tool Search alone owns Pi's active tool list. Permission System only decides whether an invoked tool call is allowed, denied, or requires confirmation.

See docs/configuration.md for the complete reference and docs/hard-guards.md for the independent hard-guard format.

Documentation

Document	Contents
docs/configuration.md	Full policy reference, runtime knobs, per-agent overrides, recipes
docs/session-approvals.md	Session-scoped rules, pattern suggestions, bash arity table
docs/cross-extension-api.md	Cross-extension service accessor, event bus integration, prompt and decision broadcasts
docs/subagent-integration.md	Permission forwarding, coexistence with subagent extensions
docs/guides/permission-frontmatter-for-subagent-extensions.md	Convention guide for subagent extension authors
docs/opencode-compatibility.md	OpenCode compatibility — shared concepts, divergences, porting guide
docs/troubleshooting.md	Common issues, diagnostic logging, threat model
docs/migration/legacy-to-flat.md	Migration from pre-v2 config layout
docs/migration/strict-config-validation.md	Strict config validation (breaking) — rejected configs, and the cross-scope fail-closed clamp
docs/migration/0644-project-trust-gating.md	Project-trust gating (breaking) — project config loads only after project trust
docs/migration/0745-prompt-payload-contracts.md	Prompt payload contracts (breaking) — the forwarded wire, the ui_prompt broadcast, and the deprecated preview caps
docs/migration/0746-review-log-fields.md	Review-log fields (breaking) — message replaced by request facts, and the reviewLogFieldMaxWidth bound

Development

pnpm run check       # Type-check TypeScript (no emit)
pnpm run lint        # Biome + ESLint + lint:md
pnpm run lint:md     # rumdl on README and docs
pnpm run test        # Run tests from ./test
pnpm run test:watch  # Run tests in watch mode

Pre-commit hooks

This project uses prek to run Biome, ESLint, and rumdl on staged files before each commit. Run pnpm install to set up hooks automatically.

Acknowledgments

This project began as a fork of MasuRii/pi-permission-system. Thank you to MasuRii for the original work that made this possible.

Thank you to the OpenCode team for the permission model design that inspired the flat config format and evaluation semantics used in this extension.

License

MIT