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167 lines
6.9 KiB
Markdown
167 lines
6.9 KiB
Markdown
# pi-ssh
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`pi-ssh` keeps Pi and its local tools on the local machine while exposing explicit remote tools over a persistent Node `ssh2` connection:
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- `ssh_read`
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- `ssh_write`
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- `ssh_edit`
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- `ssh_find`
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- `ssh_grep`
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- `ssh_bash`
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The extension does not override Pi's local `read`, `write`, `edit`, `find`, `grep`, or `bash` tools.
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## Architecture
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Runtime connections are pure `ssh2`; the extension does not spawn OpenSSH and does not require `sshpass`, `ControlMaster`, or passwordless login. Remote file operations use SFTP and remote shell commands use an SSH exec channel.
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Hosts must be explicitly imported before use. OpenSSH remains only an import source: the configuration helper runs `ssh -G <alias>` once to resolve the selected alias, then stores the resulting endpoint and authentication data in the pi-ssh vault. Later changes to `~/.ssh/config` require re-importing the host.
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ProxyJump and ProxyCommand are intentionally rejected in the first ssh2 release.
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## Configure hosts
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From the installed bundle or this repository:
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```sh
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./ssh_config.sh import
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./ssh_config.sh import packaging-server
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```
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The helper:
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1. lets you select concrete aliases from `~/.ssh/config`;
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2. uses `ssh -G` to resolve HostName, User, Port, and IdentityFile;
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3. asks whether the selected host uses a private key or password;
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4. asks for a private-key passphrase when needed;
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5. obtains and displays the server's SHA256 host-key fingerprint;
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6. connects with `ssh2` to verify authentication;
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7. optionally assigns a display label and group;
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8. writes the encrypted vault.
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Other commands:
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```sh
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./ssh_config.sh list
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./ssh_config.sh update packaging-server
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./ssh_config.sh remove packaging-server
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./ssh_config.sh rotate-key
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```
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Secret prompts require an interactive terminal. Passwords and passphrases are never passed as command-line arguments.
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## Vault
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The default paths are:
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```text
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${XDG_CONFIG_HOME:-$HOME/.config}/my-pi/pi-ssh/
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├── hosts.enc
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└── vault.key
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```
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On POSIX systems the directory is mode `700` and both files are mode `600`. `hosts.enc` is encrypted and authenticated with AES-256-GCM; `vault.key` contains the adjacent random 256-bit key. Writes use a fresh IV and an atomic temporary-file rename. Plaintext configuration is never written to a temporary file.
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This is deliberately a **casual-disclosure boundary**, not protection against compromise of the local account: anyone who can read both files can decrypt the vault. Encryption prevents the host configuration and passwords from being exposed by accidentally viewing or copying `hosts.enc` alone.
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The encrypted payload contains host endpoints, pinned host-key fingerprints, groups, and either:
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- a private-key path plus optional passphrase; or
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- the server password.
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Private-key contents are not copied into the vault.
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## Usage
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Connect interactively:
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```text
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/ssh
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/ssh packaging-server
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/ssh packaging-server:/absolute/remote/path
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/ssh status
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/ssh off
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```
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Or at startup:
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```sh
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pi --ssh packaging-server
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pi --ssh packaging-server:/absolute/remote/path
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```
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Only imported host IDs are accepted. Arbitrary `user@host` targets are rejected.
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The active host ID and remote cwd are stored in the Pi session for resume. Credentials are never stored in Pi session entries.
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## Runtime behavior
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- One persistent `ssh2` client is used for the active host.
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- Each `ssh_bash` call opens an exec channel and runs under `bash -lc` in the selected remote cwd.
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- SFTP provides remote reads and writes.
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- Writes use a temporary remote file and prefer OpenSSH's atomic rename SFTP extension when the server supports it.
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- A pinned SHA256 host-key mismatch fails closed.
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- Connection loss fails closed; the extension does not silently replay a command.
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- Remote `AGENTS.md` and `CLAUDE.md` files are never discovered or injected.
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- `ssh_find` and `ssh_grep` perform capability detection inside each approved call and return at most 200 bounded result lines.
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- RTK treats only `ssh_bash` as a Bash output-compaction alias; it does not rewrite remote commands or process remote search/read results.
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### Adaptive remote search
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`ssh_find` performs fixed-substring path matching with this backend order:
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```text
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fd → fdfind → git ls-files → find
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```
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`ssh_grep` defaults to literal, case-insensitive content matching with this backend order:
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```text
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ripgrep → git grep → find + grep
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```
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No backend is installed or uploaded. The tools use what the server already provides, report the chosen backend and truncation state, and cap `limit` at 200. A genuine no-match result succeeds with zero rows; invalid regexes, missing roots, and backend failures remain errors even though output passes through bounded `head`/`cut` stages. Narrow `path` and `pattern` when truncated rather than increasing the limit. Direct `find`, `fd`, `grep`, and `rg` commands remain forbidden through `ssh_bash`; use the structured search tools instead. Regex mode (`literal: false`) follows the selected backend's regex dialect.
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The remote host must provide `bash`. SFTP support is required for file tools.
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## Permission-system integration
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All remote operations enter the bundle's existing permission chain:
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- `ssh_read`, `ssh_write`, `ssh_edit`, `ssh_find`, and `ssh_grep` start as `ask`;
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- `ssh_bash` uses the full deterministic Bash policy and `decisionFloor: "ask"`;
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- deterministic hard denies remain denies;
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- asks enter the configured `auto-review` authorizer;
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- reviewer failures defer to the normal terminal prompt.
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Permission evidence includes the configured host ID, resolved endpoint, port, remote cwd, and a bounded operation summary. It never includes passwords, passphrases, private-key contents, or the vault key. Remote paths are not normalized as local filesystem paths.
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## Security notes
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- Import only servers you control or trust.
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- Verify host-key fingerprints through an independent channel before accepting them.
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- Treat both vault files as secrets even though `hosts.enc` is encrypted.
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- The extension's threat model does not protect credentials from malicious code already running as the same local user.
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- Password keyboard-interactive mode reuses the configured password for the server's prompts; use it only with a trusted pinned host.
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- Remote content reaches the model only through an explicit `ssh_*` call or explicit user `!` command.
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## Development
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```sh
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npm test
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```
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Important files:
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- `index.ts` — Pi extension and tool registration
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- `src/ssh2-transport.ts` — persistent ssh2, exec, and SFTP transport
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- `src/config.ts` — validated configuration types
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- `src/vault.ts` — AES-GCM vault
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- `src/import.ts` — `ssh -G` import helpers
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- `scripts/ssh-config.mjs` — interactive configuration CLI
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- `permission-integration.ts` — permission-system bridge
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## Upstream and license
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This maintained fork originates from `pansapiens/pi-ssh`; see [UPSTREAM.md](UPSTREAM.md). The pure ssh2 design also references the transport architecture in `@99percentpeople/pi-ssh-remote` without adopting its local-tool override model. Licensed under MIT; see [LICENSE](LICENSE).
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