Files
my-pi/config/pi-permission-policy.jsonc
T
云服务部-叶林立andDevin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> 2a6bf8c929 feat(pi-overflow): 新增统一的新工具结果展示截断扩展
此前截断分散在多层且互相冲突:Pi bash 保留尾部 50KB,RTK 兜底截断又只留
开头 12000 字符(砍掉报错与完整输出路径),pi-chrome 截开头 30K,web_fetch
各 provider 不一致。新扩展统一负责"新结果给模型看多少":
- capture.ts 最先加载暂存原文,index.ts 最后加载(system-prompt 之前)
- 超过 24K 字符时原文落盘 <agentDir>/my-pi/pi-overflow/(700/600、原子写),
  优先取 bash fullOutputPath 完整文件;模型看到 头 + 中段信号行 + 尾 的有界
  视图,行号基于落盘原文、结尾永远可见
- overflow_query:按 id 正则搜索、行区间、jsonPath 只读查询,id 校验防穿越
- 收编:RTK truncate 默认关闭、删除 pi-chrome truncateText、web_fetch 默认
  每页 20000(上限 100000)、web_search max_results 限定 1–20
- pi-compaction 遮蔽带 details.overflow.id 的结果时在占位符提示 overflow_query
- 登记 tools.jsonc / routing / 权限 allow / tool-search 常驻与分组

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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-21 20:25:44 -07:00

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{
"debugLog": true,
"permissionReviewLog": true,
"yoloMode": false,
"doublePressToConfirm": true,
// AutoReview is the default authority for deterministic review decisions.
//
// The reviewer is a conversational model asked to judge one planned action
// under a bundled security policy. With no provider/model pair it follows
// the session's current model, so review quality tracks whatever you run.
// It answers by calling `approve` or `reject`; a reject — and every failure
// (timeout, provider error, malformed verdict) — defers to the human
// permission prompt with the model's reason shown. Approvals are cached
// within one user message, so the same ask does not pay for a second review.
//
// To pin a dedicated review model instead, set BOTH "provider" and "model";
// exactly one set is a misconfiguration and also defers to the human.
// "reasoning" defaults to "low" and only applies to reasoning-capable models.
"authorizerChain": ["auto-review"],
"autoReview": {
"enabled": true
},
"shellTools": {
"ssh_bash": {
"commandArgument": "command",
"decisionFloor": "ask"
}
},
"permission": {
// Unknown tools are reviewed instead of silently allowed.
"*": "ask",
"read": "allow",
"write": "allow",
"edit": "allow",
"grep": "allow",
"find": "allow",
"multi_grep": "allow",
"ls": "allow",
"codegraph_explore": "allow",
"lsp_diagnostics": "allow",
"lsp_definition": "allow",
"lsp_references": "allow",
"lsp_hover": "allow",
"lsp_symbols": "allow",
"ctx_execute": "allow",
"ctx_execute_file": "allow",
"ctx_batch_execute": "allow",
"ctx_search": "allow",
"ctx_index": "allow",
"ctx_stats": "allow",
"ctx_doctor": "allow",
"tool_search": "allow",
"ask_user_question": "allow",
// Launching, steering or reading a subagent has no side effect itself;
// every child action is still gated by the permission system and any
// unresolved "ask" is forwarded to the root session.
"Agent": "allow",
"get_subagent_result": "allow",
"steer_subagent": "allow",
"web_search": "allow",
"chrome_snapshot": "allow",
"chrome_find": "allow",
"chrome_inspect": "allow",
"chrome_wait_for": "allow",
"chrome_screenshot": "allow",
"chrome_list_console_messages": "allow",
"chrome_list_network_requests": "allow",
"chrome_get_network_request": "allow",
// Hermes memory tools write only to the extension's own agent-directory
// stores and never touch the workspace, so they stay allowed. memory_search
// is invoked by the injected memory policy on most turns and must not
// trigger an AutoReview round trip each time.
"memory_search": "allow",
"session_search": "allow",
"memory_add": "allow",
"memory_replace": "allow",
"memory_remove": "allow",
// Skills skill_manage writes are loaded into every future session, so
// their creation stays human-reviewed.
"skill_manage": "ask",
// pi-compaction's evidence recovery reads only the extension's own segment
// index and never touches the workspace. It is pinned in Tool Search's
// alwaysEnabled set, so it must not pay an AutoReview round trip per turn.
"context_tree_query": "allow",
// pi-overflow's inspector reads only the extension's own stored output
// directory (id-validated); pinned in Tool Search's alwaysEnabled set.
"overflow_query": "allow",
// Model-chosen URLs can exfiltrate data — same reason curl/wget ask.
"web_fetch": "ask",
"ctx_fetch_and_index": "ask",
"ssh_connect": "ask",
"ssh_cd": "ask",
"ssh_read": "ask",
"ssh_write": "ask",
"ssh_edit": "ask",
"ssh_find": "ask",
"ssh_grep": "ask",
"path": {
"*": "allow",
".git/*": "ask"
},
"bash": {
"*": "allow",
"rg*": "deny",
"grep*": "deny",
"find*": "deny",
"fd*": "deny",
"git *": "ask",
"git status*": "allow",
"git diff*": "allow",
"git log*": "allow",
"git show*": "allow",
"git rev-parse*": "allow",
"git ls-files*": "allow",
"git grep*": "deny",
"git branch": "allow",
"git branch --show-current*": "allow",
"git remote -v": "allow",
"git remote get-url*": "allow",
"git blame*": "allow",
"git describe*": "allow",
"git rev-list*": "allow",
"git merge-base*": "allow",
"git ls-tree*": "allow",
"git cat-file*": "allow",
"git name-rev*": "allow",
"git shortlog*": "allow",
"git stash list*": "allow",
"git worktree list*": "allow",
"git tag -l*": "allow",
"git tag --list*": "allow",
"git config --get*": "allow",
"git config --list*": "allow",
"npm install *": "ask",
"npm add *": "ask",
"npm uninstall *": "ask",
"npm update *": "ask",
"pnpm install *": "ask",
"pnpm add *": "ask",
"pnpm uninstall *": "ask",
"pnpm update *": "ask",
"bun install *": "ask",
"bun add *": "ask",
"bun uninstall *": "ask",
"bun update *": "ask",
"pip install *": "ask",
"pip3 install *": "ask",
"brew install *": "ask",
"brew uninstall *": "ask",
"rm *": "ask",
"/bin/rm *": "ask",
"rmdir *": "ask",
"/bin/rmdir *": "ask",
"unlink *": "ask",
"/usr/bin/unlink *": "ask",
"mv *": "ask",
"/bin/mv *": "ask",
"truncate *": "ask",
"dd *": "ask",
"chmod *": "ask",
"chown *": "ask",
"sudo *": "ask",
"su *": "ask",
"kill *": "ask",
"pkill *": "ask",
"diskutil *": "ask",
"security *": "ask",
"launchctl *": "ask",
"osascript *": "ask",
"open *": "ask",
"ssh *": "ask",
"scp *": "ask",
"sftp *": "ask",
"rsync *": "ask",
"curl *": "ask",
"wget *": "ask",
"printenv*": "ask"
},
"skill": {
"*": "allow"
}
}
}