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39 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security policy
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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Open a GitHub issue prefixed with `[security]` at https://github.com/tianrendong/pi-chrome/issues, or contact the maintainer directly if the issue is sensitive. Please do **not** include exploit details in a public issue without coordinating first.
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## Threat model
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`pi-chrome` is a developer tool you install knowingly. It is **not** designed to defend against:
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- Hostile pages running in your Chrome trying to detect or escape automation. (Standard browser security boundaries still apply, but a hostile page that already runs in your tab can do anything that page can already do.)
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- Other processes on your local machine. The bridge binds to `127.0.0.1:17318` (loopback only) and chrome_* tools require `/chrome authorize` inside Pi, but the bridge does not authenticate arbitrary non-browser local callers. If your threat model includes hostile local processes running as you, run pi-chrome on a separate user account.
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`pi-chrome` **is** designed to:
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- Never exfiltrate page state to the network. All communication is loopback (`127.0.0.1`).
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- Surface every action with an honest result envelope so the agent can't silently do the wrong thing.
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- Keep Chrome control locked until the user explicitly runs `/chrome authorize` in the current Pi session.
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- Reject browser-origin command requests to the loopback bridge so ordinary web pages cannot use CORS to drive Chrome.
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## The companion extension
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The Chrome extension under `extensions/chrome-profile-bridge/browser-extension/` runs with broad permissions: `tabs`, `scripting`, `debugger`, `webNavigation`, etc. **Only install it from a package source you trust.** Read the source before loading. Pin a known-good commit if you're security-sensitive.
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## Defaults
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- Loopback bridge only. No remote port. No telemetry.
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- Chrome real input layer for interactive controls.
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- Chrome control locked by default; `/chrome authorize` unlocks current Pi session after terminal confirmation, `/chrome revoke` locks it again.
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- Run-in-background optional; tab/window focus is observable by default (the user can see Pi acting).
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## Custom ports
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The bundled Chrome extension currently polls `127.0.0.1:17318`. Custom bridge ports are not supported without editing the extension source and reloading it.
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## Supported versions
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The latest minor on npm is supported. Security patches will be released as soon as practical.
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