Files
my-pi/config/pi-permission-policy.jsonc
T
云服务部-叶林立andDevin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> f9a7f743dd feat: 接入 Pi 内置 codemode,并修复全面审查发现的问题
- codemode:Tool Search 常驻(alwaysEnabled)、权限 allow(嵌套调用仍逐个过权限门)、
  tools.jsonc 登记使用规则;RTK 跳过 parentToolCallId 嵌套调用,避免丢失 bash
  structuredContent;Tool Search 目录过滤 hidden / codemode(script-only)exposure;
  扩展加载测试加载 builtin:codemode 并断言其常驻激活
- 搜索 key 不再经命令行参数传递:search-auth.mjs 改为 --set-stdin(先读校验再加锁),
  configure.sh 交互输入经管道、非交互用 --<provider> -
- CodeGraph 客户端监听子进程 stdin error,避免 EPIPE 未处理导致崩溃
- 移除 PI_TOOL_SEARCH/HERMES_MEMORY/RTK_CONFIG_PATH 环境变量入口,测试改用工厂 configPath 注入
- pi-subagents 固定 vitest / coverage-istanbul 4.1.10,修复 npm ls 版本冲突
- 补 pi-web-search / pi-worktree UPSTREAM.md 与 pi-minimal-footer AGENTS.md,
  files 白名单补齐并加测试;.codegraph/.gitignore 移出跟踪
- detect_kitty 优先识别官方安装目录

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Co-Authored-By: Devin <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-21 23:18:34 -07:00

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{
"debugLog": true,
"permissionReviewLog": true,
"yoloMode": false,
"doublePressToConfirm": true,
// AutoReview is the default authority for deterministic review decisions.
//
// The reviewer is a conversational model asked to judge one planned action
// under a bundled security policy. With no provider/model pair it follows
// the session's current model, so review quality tracks whatever you run.
// It answers by calling `approve` or `reject`; a reject — and every failure
// (timeout, provider error, malformed verdict) — defers to the human
// permission prompt with the model's reason shown. Approvals are cached
// within one user message, so the same ask does not pay for a second review.
//
// To pin a dedicated review model instead, set BOTH "provider" and "model";
// exactly one set is a misconfiguration and also defers to the human.
// "reasoning" defaults to "low" and only applies to reasoning-capable models.
"authorizerChain": ["auto-review"],
"autoReview": {
"enabled": true
},
"shellTools": {
"ssh_bash": {
"commandArgument": "command",
"decisionFloor": "ask"
}
},
"permission": {
// Unknown tools are reviewed instead of silently allowed.
"*": "ask",
"read": "allow",
"write": "allow",
"edit": "allow",
"grep": "allow",
"find": "allow",
"multi_grep": "allow",
"ls": "allow",
"codegraph_explore": "allow",
"lsp_diagnostics": "allow",
"lsp_definition": "allow",
"lsp_references": "allow",
"lsp_hover": "allow",
"lsp_symbols": "allow",
"tool_search": "allow",
"ask_user_question": "allow",
// Launching, steering or reading a subagent has no side effect itself;
// every child action is still gated by the permission system and any
// unresolved "ask" is forwarded to the root session.
"Agent": "allow",
"get_subagent_result": "allow",
"steer_subagent": "allow",
"web_search": "allow",
"chrome_snapshot": "allow",
"chrome_find": "allow",
"chrome_inspect": "allow",
"chrome_wait_for": "allow",
"chrome_screenshot": "allow",
"chrome_list_console_messages": "allow",
"chrome_list_network_requests": "allow",
"chrome_get_network_request": "allow",
// Hermes memory tools write only to the extension's own agent-directory
// stores and never touch the workspace, so they stay allowed. memory_search
// is invoked by the injected memory policy on most turns and must not
// trigger an AutoReview round trip each time.
"memory_search": "allow",
"session_search": "allow",
"memory_add": "allow",
"memory_replace": "allow",
"memory_remove": "allow",
// Skills skill_manage writes are loaded into every future session, so
// their creation stays human-reviewed.
"skill_manage": "ask",
// pi-compaction's evidence recovery reads only the extension's own segment
// index and never touches the workspace. It is pinned in Tool Search's
// alwaysEnabled set, so it must not pay an AutoReview round trip per turn.
"context_tree_query": "allow",
// pi-overflow's inspector reads only the extension's own stored output
// directory (id-validated); pinned in Tool Search's alwaysEnabled set.
"overflow_query": "allow",
// A codemode script does nothing by itself: every nested tool call it makes
// runs through this same gate (Pi emits tool_call with parentToolCallId).
"codemode": "allow",
// Model-chosen URLs can exfiltrate data — same reason curl/wget ask.
"web_fetch": "ask",
"ssh_connect": "ask",
"ssh_cd": "ask",
"ssh_read": "ask",
"ssh_write": "ask",
"ssh_edit": "ask",
"ssh_find": "ask",
"ssh_grep": "ask",
"path": {
"*": "allow",
".git/*": "ask"
},
"bash": {
"*": "allow",
"rg*": "deny",
"grep*": "deny",
"find*": "deny",
"fd*": "deny",
"git *": "ask",
"git status*": "allow",
"git diff*": "allow",
"git log*": "allow",
"git show*": "allow",
"git rev-parse*": "allow",
"git ls-files*": "allow",
"git grep*": "deny",
"git branch": "allow",
"git branch --show-current*": "allow",
"git remote -v": "allow",
"git remote get-url*": "allow",
"git blame*": "allow",
"git describe*": "allow",
"git rev-list*": "allow",
"git merge-base*": "allow",
"git ls-tree*": "allow",
"git cat-file*": "allow",
"git name-rev*": "allow",
"git shortlog*": "allow",
"git stash list*": "allow",
"git worktree list*": "allow",
"git tag -l*": "allow",
"git tag --list*": "allow",
"git config --get*": "allow",
"git config --list*": "allow",
"npm install *": "ask",
"npm add *": "ask",
"npm uninstall *": "ask",
"npm update *": "ask",
"pnpm install *": "ask",
"pnpm add *": "ask",
"pnpm uninstall *": "ask",
"pnpm update *": "ask",
"bun install *": "ask",
"bun add *": "ask",
"bun uninstall *": "ask",
"bun update *": "ask",
"pip install *": "ask",
"pip3 install *": "ask",
"brew install *": "ask",
"brew uninstall *": "ask",
"rm *": "ask",
"/bin/rm *": "ask",
"rmdir *": "ask",
"/bin/rmdir *": "ask",
"unlink *": "ask",
"/usr/bin/unlink *": "ask",
"mv *": "ask",
"/bin/mv *": "ask",
"truncate *": "ask",
"dd *": "ask",
"chmod *": "ask",
"chown *": "ask",
"sudo *": "ask",
"su *": "ask",
"kill *": "ask",
"pkill *": "ask",
"diskutil *": "ask",
"security *": "ask",
"launchctl *": "ask",
"osascript *": "ask",
"open *": "ask",
"ssh *": "ask",
"scp *": "ask",
"sftp *": "ask",
"rsync *": "ask",
"curl *": "ask",
"wget *": "ask",
"printenv*": "ask"
},
"skill": {
"*": "allow"
}
}
}